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Preface
The Economic Reconstruction Loan to the Republic of Korea in the amount of US$3 billion
was approved and made effective on December 23, 1997. The loan was fully disbursed the day of
effectiveness. The loan closed on February 28, 1998.
This Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by Richard Carroll, based on
interviews with staff and materials from the project file. Mr. Pieter Bottelier was the acting Sector
Manager and had overall responsibility for monitoring the policy matrix for the Economic
Reconstruction Loan. Messrs. Gary Perlin (Sr. VP and CFO), Sri-Ram Ayer (Country Director),
Danny Leipziger (Task Manager for the loan), Nicholas Prescott (EASHN), Douglas Webb
(LEGPS), David Scott (SFO), Hoon Mok Chung (EASPS), Hemant Shah (FPS), Wei Ding
(PREM), Shyam Khemani (PSDBE), Clifford Garstang (LEGEA), and Ms. Laura Ard (SFO)
provided comments for the ICR. Mr. Zia Qureshi oversaw production of the report.
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Evaluation Summary'
Project Origin, Objectives and Description
1. The $3 billion Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL - Loan No. 42670-KO) was the first
phase of the Bank's new ($10 billion) lending program in Korea to respond to the deepening
economic crisis and emergency liquidity needs. The ERL was approved by the Board, became
effective, and was fully disbursed on December 23, 1997. The objectives of the ERL were to:
(1) provide emergency liquidity to restore confidence in the Korean economy; and (2) develop a
framework for medium term structural reform that would serve as a basis for a program of
structural adjustment lending.
2. The ERL was both the largest and fastest made loan in the history of the Bank. It
disbursed the $3 billion principal in a single tranche and took less than three-weeks to process
from identification to effectiveness. The decision to pursue the ERL engaged the highest level of
Bank management. The ERL was also unusual because the loan was made to Korea, which had
already graduated from Bank borrowing three years earlier.
3. Policy areas under ERL. The Government's framework for structural reforms was
specified in the Government's Letter of Development Policy in December 1997 which was
signed by the Minister of Finance and Economy (see President's report P-7214-KO December
19, 1997; Appendix 2). The framework consisted of five elements: (1) macroeconomic
management; (2) financial sector restructuring; (3) corporate governance; (4) competition policy;
and (5) labor markets and social safety nets.
' The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL) describes policies and events in Korea relating to
the loan up to the implementation of the follow-up loan, the first Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL 1), which was approved by the Board on
March 26, 1998.
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Implementation Experience and Results
Overview
4. Korea was on the verge of default by the time it contacted the IMF and the Bank. Korea
could not meet its short-term liabilities, specifically, $20 billion coming due in December 1997.
Another $25 billion would be due in the first quarter of 1998. Korea's foreign exchange reserves
had declined to less than $5 billion in December 1997. Korea's most pressing need was an
infusion of capital to stave off foreign bankers who were reluctant to roll over Korea's rising
short-term debt.
5. In December 1997, the Bank, along with the IMF and the ADB and bi-lateral donors,
agreed with the Government to support a program of financial and economic stabilization and
structural reforms. Lending was prepared and negotiated by the Bank on a highly accelerated basis
in mid-December 1997.
6. Leading up to the crisis, the Bank was not conducting economic and sector work on
Korea as it would in the case of an active borrower. Because the crisis also developed suddenly,
there was not time to design the ERL based on a comprehensive data analysis, nor develop
detailed conditionality. Rather, it was derived mainly from still intact staff expertise on Korea
and their priors about the Korean economy, as well as sector and financial distress expertise
gained from countries which had earlier succumbed to the Asian Crisis.
Results
7. The most significant achievement in the immediate term was avoiding default. In
addition, the rollover ratio increased, signaling that interventions had begun to restore confidence
and that the probability of future default had declined. The short-term debt restructuring of $24
billion with creditor banks in New York, initiated in January 1998, lengthened maturities to 1 to
3 years, buying additional time for structural reform measures to be implemented.
Structural Reforms
8. The Government made significant progress on all major fronts associated with the ERL
as the summary of actions (see Section B.) shows. Actions prior to ERL effectiveness were
limited because of the urgency of the financial crisis. The vast majority of reform actions was
passed in a special session of the National Assembly on February 14, 1998, which constituted
many of the prior actions for the first Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I).
9. Financial sector reforms. The centerpiece of the ERL policy program was restructuring
and reform in the financial sector. The government committed to resolving financial institutions
that were experiencing distress, including two of the country's largest commercial banks and 14
smaller merchant banks. Other financial institutions were to be subjected to strengthened
oversight. Key reforms geared toward strengthening the financial system in the medium term
included upgrading regulation and supervision, opening the sector to foreign investment, and
iii
reducing government intervention in banks' business decisions. An important foundation for
improving regulation and supervision was to be the merger of the four existing supervisory
entities into a single agency, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) independent of both BOK
and MOFE.
10. The performance of the ERL should be viewed as part of a broader longer-term series of
efforts to stabilize the Korean economy and return it to a path of sustainable growth (see Future
Operations). The overall performance and outcome of the ERL was satisfactory, as the general
framework for medium term policy measures was achieved and proven to be relevant as
evidenced by subsequent SAL conditions. The ERL was also successful as part of the total
rescue package, because Korea averted default. This rating is consistent with the rating by
EASPR of meeting development objectives (Form 590) at project close (also Satisfactory).
Bank Performance
11. Generally speaking, the Bank did respond quickly and substantially once massive default
appeared inevitable. With the GOK and IMF, it engineered a credible reform framework for
subsequent lending. The Bank also navigated through an extremely difficult situation in which a
top performing economy with internationally recognized companies found itself, in a short time
span, near collapse. Designing a program of deep and far reaching reforms and applying them to
what was one of the Bank's greatest success stories was a difficult challenge for Bank staff and
management.
Future Operations
12. SAL I was the immediate follow-up operation, effective March 27, 1998. SAL I ($2
billion) supported Government efforts to deepen structural reform in the financial, corporate and
social (including labor markets) sectors. The next loan (SAL II) was a two tranche, $2 billion
operation building on SAL I. SAL III is planned for FY2000.
Lessons Learned
13. The major lessons learned from the ERL are:
* Maintaining a knowledge base. The Bank should maintain access to a cadre of high level
expertise that has dealt with occurences of systemic financial corporate distress, whether
accessed externally or maintained in-house. The Bank's stock of experience on Korea and on
emergencies in the corporate sector had dwindled to a very low level by the time of the
Korean crisis. Assembling a capable team was a very ad hoc exercise. Establishing the SFO,
mostly from existing staff, did establish a capacity to assist a small number of countries
already in financial distress, but not to anticipate financial crises.
* Use of non-government resources. In-country expertise outside of government can be very
useful in diagnosing economic problems, especially where there are large gaps in the Bank's
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knowledge or that knowledge is out of date. The Bank team made good use of Korean think
tanks, universities and NGOs to supplement its knowledge base in drafting the ERL.
* Maximize negotiation results during crises. Care should be taken to achieve maximum
negotiation results when a country faces an emergency. It is much easier to obtain agreement
on reforms at that time. Because the economic crisis was so severe, the Bank and IMF were
negotiating at the highest levels of the GOK where it is also easier to reach agreement
quickly. Once stabilization measures begin to work, pressure is eased and motivation for
reform lessens. In this crisis, the Bank did use Korea's urgent liquidity needs to secure
commitment to an indicative outline of reforms. Achievement of additional conditionality
and benchmarks should be guided by the trade-off between negotiating results and possible
delays that could jeopardize the effectiveness of the program (in this case, the timely delivery
of liquidity).
* Consultative approach to reforms. Creating a forum of Government, labor and business
leaders for the purpose of achieving consensus on reforms affecting these three major groups
is an effective vehicle to gain support for economic reforms.
* Disclosure/transparency. An essential initial step in resolving problems in the corporate
sector is disclosure. It is the sine qua non of subsequent reforms, as well as making accurate
credit assessments and regaining the confidence of foreign lenders.
* Need for explicit competition reforms. The ERL contained an explicitly stated, discrete set
of competition reforms as a basis for sustaining the reform program. A clear set of
competition policies was important to Korea because of the rent-seeking, over-investing
behavior of the chaebols that had led to the crisis. The Bank could make greater use of this
practice of incorporating competition measures as part of its program of lending
prescriptions. Reform packages are enhanced when they include competition policies in
areas such as foreign ownership, supervision of banks, and corruption.
* Crisis management tool. The use of parallel teams, one in Korea and one in headquarters
(the latter shepherding papers through by day), was an effective way to accelerate processing
of the-Korea ERL.
* Accelerated processing for emergencies. In emergency circumstances such as the Korean
crisis, the Bank demonstrated the necessity of relaxing reporting requirements in order to
respond quickly and so that expertise may be freed for more substantive analysis and creative
solutions.
* Management of portfolio risk. The Bank has to have the capacity to systematically manage
a shift in the risk of its portfolio. To assess risk adjustment for capital allocation in the ERL
case, Bank staff had to improvise to find pricing that would appropriately account for the
sudden change in the Bank's risk profile. At the time the Korean crisis hit, the Bank's
financial policy department had begun to study ways to analyze and estimate risk-adjusted
return on capital in the context of the Bank's capital adequacy requirement.
v* Inseparability of program design and loan terms. Lending terms and substantive reform
program design must be negotiated together. This was not the case for ERL. In fairness, the
borrower should know early on the cost of capital attached to the reform program to which it
is agreeing.
* Single tranche approach. A single tranche policy-based operation (such as ERL), with an
indicative outline of policy actions clearly laid out prior to Board approval, was an effective
vehicle for rapid liquidity transfer. Although the urgency of liquidity needs limited upfront
actions for ERL, follow-up SALs restored leverage to the Bank in reform negotiations after the
ERL disbursed.
* Need for stronger commitment with regionalized crises. When a crisis is regionalized,
positive results from reformns may be slower to be realized. Investor confidence is more
difficult to restore as well as growth in aggregate demand. The Government and the Bank had
to demonstrate greater resolve in adhering to the reform program.
* Consistency with the Bank's business. The Bank should adhere to a clear concept of what
business it is in and be careful not to redefine its business according to the market
opportunity. That the ERL provided emergency liquidity raised concern that the Bank was
straying from its role as a development institution. This concern contributed to subsequent
Bank policy in the form of special SALs.
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PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. Objectives, Background and Description
Objectives
1. The $3 billion Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL - Loan No. 42670-KO) was the first
phase of the Bank's new ($10 billion) lending program in Korea to respond to the deepening
economic crisis and emergency liquidity needs. The ERL was approved by the Board, became
effective, and was fully disbursed on December 23, 1997. The objectives of the ERL were to:
(1) provide emergency liquidity to restore confidence in the Korean economy; and (2) develop a
framework for medium term structural reform that would serve as a basis for a program of
structural adjustment lending.
Background
2. The ERL was both the largest and fastest made loan in the history of the Bank. It
disbursed the $3 billion principal in a single tranche and took less than three-weeks to process
from identification to effectiveness. The decision to pursue the ERL engaged the highest level of
Bank management. The ERL was also unusual because the loan was made to Korea, which had
already graduated from Bank borrowing (FY95). Because it was a reconstruction loan, it was
designed mainly to provide an indicative framework for reform and its conditions were not as
comprehemnsive as those of a typical structural adjustment loan (SAL). To add to its uniqueness,
loan pricing was substantially higher than standard for a SAL, and the pricing and amount of the
loan were not determined until Board presentation.
3. The Asian Crisis hit Korea in October/November 1997, four months after it began in
Thailand. The adverse economic events leading up to the crisis set the stage for this
extraordinary loan:
* A decline in the terms of trade which began in 1995, a cyclical downturn in the electronics
sector in which Korea invested heavily, and an increase in the current account deficit to $23
billion by 1996
* An external debt increase to $120 billion by September 1997, over half of which was short-
term
* The failure of a large chaebol, Hanbo, followed by other large failures due mainly to the
financial drain caused by over-leveraging to pay for diversification
2* Loss of investor confidence in the region with the geographical spread of the crisis
* The weakened ability of the government to deal with the developing crisis because of (a)
election setbacks of the ruling party; (b) corruption scandals; and (c) less than full agreement
on policy between the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Central Bank.
4. The Government attempted to defuse the crisis on November 19 with policy measures: to
deal with distressed assets, including increased funding for the Korea Asset Management
Corporation (KAMCO), to bolster deposit insurance, to improve transparency of financial
operations and to liberalize the capital account by increasing the scope of foreign ownership of
Korean financial assets. However, when the exchange rate band for the Won was widened to +/-
10 percent, the Won plummeted, losing 50 percent of its value by December 11. Korea requested
assistance from the IMF and the Bank in late November. -
5. By the time Korea contacted the IMF and the Bank, it was on the verge of default. Korea
was not going to be able to meet its short-term liabilities, specifically, $20 billion coming due in
December 1997. Another $25 billion would be due in the first quarter of 1998. Korea's foreign
exchange reserves had declined to less than $5 billion in December 1997. Korea's most pressing
need was an infusion of capital to stave off foreign bankers who were reluctant to roll over
Korea's rising short-term debt.
6. The ERL was prepared in close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The IMF Board approved a three year $21 billion Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) on December 4,
1997. The total IMF-coordinated support package, including other multi- and bilateral sources,
was about $57 billion, of which the Bank pledged up to $10 billion. The package included "a
second line of defense" by G-7 countries in the event of a second wave of the crisis.
Description
7. Program elements. The Government's framework for structural reforms was specified
in the Government's Letter of Development Policy in December 1997 which was signed by the
Minister of Finance and Economy (see President's report P-7214-KO December 19, 1997,
Appendix 2). The framework consisted of five elements: (1) macroeconomic management; (2)
financial-sector restructuring; (3) corporate governance; (4) competition policy; and (5) labor
markets and social safety nets. The IMF took the lead on macroeconomic stabilization measures,
along with trade policy and capital account liberalization. In the financial sector, the IMF and
the Bank worked together in overall financial restructuring. Specific areas of cooperation
included restructuring of merchant banks and commercial banks, legal reforms, supervision and
regulation, development of primary and secondary markets for securities, etc. The Bank led in
the other structural reform areas in the corporate sector, labor markets and social protection.
8. The general framework for the future reform program (to be supported by SALs) was
agreed prior to Board presentation. There were no issues of consistency of ERL with the
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) because Korea had graduated and there was no current CAS
during ERL implementation. (A new CAS is expected to be presented to the Board in 1999.)
However, at graduation, Korean authorities asked for permission to seek further Bank assistance
under three contingencies: (1) political developments with North Korea; (2) a severe natural
disaster; or (3) a sudden economic shock. Recent economic developments supported a case for
3resumption of borrowing under the third contingency. With the establishment of the policy
framework supported by ERL, the Government met the broad conditions to justify emergency
Bank support of $3 billion with an overall program that envisaged lending up to US$10 billion
for a two to three-year period. Annex B summarizes the policy actions outlined under ERL and
developed and supported under SAL I and their status as of March 1998. Because of the urgency
of the financial crisis, upfront actions under ERL were limited.
9. The ERL reform framework emphasizes a shift in incentives in financial policies and
corporate govemance away from those that precipitated the crisis. For years leading up to the
crisis, the chaebols followed a practice of increasing leverage to diversify their holdings, which
was encouraged by growing demand and a regime of subsidized interest rates. Increasing
leverage also meant higher returns on equity. Financial strains associated with high leverage
were viewed by the chaebols as a cashflow problem that could be remedied by a captive financial
sector. But the historical pattern broke when Korea's terms of trade declined, export growth
slowed, and confidence in Korea's creditworthiness among foreign creditors deteriorated,
especially as the Asian Crisis spread. Concern over a healthy balance sheet did not arise until the
first large chaebol went bankrupt in January, 1997.
10. Financial sector reforms. The centerpiece of the ERL policy program was restructuring
and reform in the financial sector. The government committed to resolving financial institutions
that were experiencing distress, including two of the country's largest commercial banks and 14
smaller merchant banks. Other financial institutions were to be subjected to strengthened
oversight. One important mechanism for resolving distressed institutions was the purchase of
non-performing loans (NPLs) by the KAMCO, which was to be strengthened financially and
operationally.
11. Key reforns geared toward strengthening the financial system in the medium term
included upgrading regulation and supervision, opening the sector to foreign investment, and
reducing government intervention in banks' business decisions. An important foundation for
improving regulation and supervision was to be the merger of the four existing supervisory
entities into a single agency, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) independent of both Bank
of Korea (BOK) and MOFE.
12. Non-standard loan pricing. The pricing of the ERL was another non-standard feature
and was driven more by the Bank's supply of funds than Korea's credit situation. The Korean
ERL was a large increase in overall Bank lending at a time when lending had not grown in net
terms for several years. The Bank's capital was strained and had to be built up to maintain the 13
percent reserves to loan ratio. It was decided that the ERL be priced such that other countries
would not incur higher borrowing costs as a result of this loan to Korea. Therefore, the Korea
ERL could not be priced as a standard product. The features of the ERL pricing were:
* LIBOR based--6-month LIBOR plus 1 percent
* Upfront fee--2 percent of principal at effectiveness plus 1 percent of the principal one year
after effectiveness and 0.5 percent two years after effectiveness
* Term-- 10 years
* Grace period--5 years
413. At the time of ERL approval, standard SAL pricing was 50 basis points above the Bank's
cost of borrowing, with no upfront service charge. (At the time of this ICR, the SAL price is 75
basis points above the Bank's borrowing cost, and a 1.0 percent service charge-effective July 31,
1998). The Bank assessed higher upfront fees to cover the costs in making the loan. The higher
fees provided additional insurance to the Bank should Korea exercise its prepayment option and
protected other Bank borrowers from increased costs. A commitmnent fee was also part of the
pricing, but was not material because the entire loan was disbursed upon effectiveness.
B. Achievement of Objectives
Recent Macroeconomic Performance and Stabilization Results
14. Macroeconomic indicators were mixed after loan effectiveness. Developments between
ERL and SAL I effectiveness (March 27, 1998) include progress on stabilization of the exchange
rate from a high of W1,960/$ to around W1,600/$, a stock market recovery of 45 percent from its
crisis low, and an increase in reserves to $18.5 billion from $4 billion. Still, short term debt
amounted to $43 billion, which was very high compared to reserves. Interest rates, which had
peaked at 30-33 percent in December 1997, subsided to 20-24 percent by the time of SAL I
effectiveness. Domestic corporate debt stood at about W400 trillion (roughly 100 percent of
GDP), and the GDP was estimated to decline by 7 percent in 1998. The estimated budget deficit
is 5 percent of GDP for 1998, along with a current account surplus of $39.5 billion owing to a
large compression of imports. Exports rose in volume terms, but not in value terms due to a
continuing decline in Korea's export prices. The target for usable reserves of $40 billion or 2.9
months of imports by the end of the year is expected to be exceeded by over $5 billion. This
target is surpassed due to the current account surplus and strengthening of the capital account and
foreign direct investment, funds from the international support package, $11 billion of which will
be provided by the IMF, Bank and ADB. By February 1998, Korea had received already 72
percent of its allocation under the $21 billion (SDR S5.5 billion) IMF SBA.
5Table 1 Selected Economic Indicators
r
Real GDP % change 8.9 7.1 5.5 -7.0 -1.0
Gross domestic inv.-% of GDP 37.0 38.4 35.0 22.1 29.5
Gross national saving 35.2 33.7 33.1 35.4 36.2
CPI-end period 4.7 4.9 6.6 5.5 3.5
Terms of trade -3.5 -12.3 -11.3 1.3 -5.1
Gov't budget balance % of GDP 0.3 0.3 0.3 -5.0 -5.1
Reserve money growth 16.3 -12.2 -12.5 1.2 16.5
Balance of Payments-US$ billion
Exports, f.o.b. 124.6 130.0 138.6 131.6 133.7
Imports, f.o.b. -129.1 -144.9 -141.8 -89.1 -98.5
Current Acct. Balance -8.5 -23.0 -8.2 39.5 22.0
Usable reserves-eop 28.5 29.4 9.1 45.6 55.0
External Debt-Total-US$ billion 119.7 157.5 154.4 147.9 131.9
of which Short-term 78.7 100.0 68.4 35.3 31.7
External Debt-% of GDP 26.4 32.5 34.9 49.7 39.7
Debt-service ratio (MLT debt) - 7.6 8.9 12.9 16.1
Source: IMF
15. The most significant achievement in the immediate term was avoiding default. In
addition, the rollover ratio increased, signaling that interventions had begun to restore confidence
and that the probability of future default had declined. The short-term debt restructuring of $24
billion with creditor banks in New York in January 1998 lengthened maturities to 1 to 3 years,
buying additional time for structural reform measures to be implemented.
Structural Reforms
16. The Government made significant progress on all major fronts associated with the ERL
as the following summary of actions shows. The vast majority of these actions was passed in a
special session of the National Assembly on February 14, 1998, and constituted prior actions for
SAL I. (SAL I continued to expand and deepen these reforms)
1. Macroeconomic
17. The macroeconomic framework was agreed with the IMF, which oversees benchmarks in
this area.
62. Financial
18. During the period of ERL implementation, the underlying insolvency of the financial
system became more apparent to government. Its efforts on the financial system were therefore
focused almost entirely on priority tasks relating to dealing with insolvent and illiquid financial
institutions. Medium term issues were in many cases deferred, generally with the concurrence of
the Bank.
19. Workout Program. The incoming government took steps to tackle the crisis by
assigning responsibility for dealing with financial distress to the Financial Supervisory
Commission (FSC), the FSS oversight body that was to become operational on April 1, 1998.
Prior to that, responsibility rested principally with the General-Secretary of the Presidential
transition team (Joint Presidential Task Force), who later became the Chairman of the FSC.
Under ERL, two major distressed commercial banks (Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank) were
nationalized and preparations begun for sale to international financial institutions. The majority
of the distressed merchant banks were closed (12 by March 1998, eventually 16). GOK provided
support to all commercial banks via the purchase of non-performing loans by KAMCO, and the
purchase by government-controlled investment funds of subordinated debt issued by the banks.
* GOK assumed control of Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, wrote down existing
shareholders' stake in the two banks to around 7 percent of their original stake and injected
new capital (although, ultimately, insufficient to restore capital adequacy). Outside experts
were hired in early 1998 to assess asset quality and perform diagnostic audits. Investment
banks were invited to develop privatization strategy for these two banks. An investment
banking firm was chosen in April 1998and the date for the implementation of the strategy
vvas set under SAL II for first Spring 1999.
* (0OK suspended the operations of 14 merchant banks in December and called for
rehabilitation plans of all merchant banks. Following a first round of review by an
independent evaluation committee, GOK revoked the licenses and ordered the closure of 10
merchant banks in early February. A "bridge" merchant bank was established to pay out
depositors and dispose of assets of the closed banks.
* Public support was provided to potentially viable banks to strengthen their balance sheets.
KAMCO purchased an estimated half of impaired loans at a discount to face value, though it
was later realized that the amount of impaired loans had been underestimated. The
Government subscribed to subordinated debt issued by commercial banks (to raise capital
ratios by 1-2 percentage points).
20. Supervision Framework. GOK enacted legislation to consolidate, effective January 4,
1999, the pre-existing four supervisory agencies into the FSS reporting to the Prime Minister.
The FSC was established and became operational, on schedule on April 1, 1998. Under ERL,
GOK began making plans to commission diagnostic reviews by third parties of all banks,
designed in part to test the adequacy of loan loss provisioning. Full-scale supervisory training
was essentially deferred pending the merger of the agencies. At the writing of this ICR a
consulting firmn is being contracted to strengthen training programs as part of a broader set of
tasks.
7The newly enacted supervisory structure consolidated various supervisory functions-
covering banks, non-bank financial institutions and capital markets-in one body under the
direct supervision of the Prime Minister's Office. The powers of supervisory authorities to
intervene in and resolve troubled financial institutions were clarified and enhanced.
21. Strengthening the Financial Sector. Policy loans through MOFE were stopped. Under
the ERL, the government eliminated the restriction on foreign bank ownership of commercial
and merchant banks (although there did not appear to be any foreign capital actually entering the
system in the months immediately following ERL effectiveness). The various deposit insurance
entities were consolidated into a new Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC). KDIC
became a key instrument for financing the resolution of insolvent financial institutions.
* The Bank of Korea Act was amended to provide for greater independence of the central bank
in setting monetary and credit policy.
* To encourage foreign investment in domestic financial institutions, the four percent limit on
individual foreign ownership in any commercial bank was abolished. The purchase of bank
equity by a single foreign bank is now permitted without limit, but requires approval at three
stages: 10, 15 and 33 percent.
22. Develop Competitive Financial System. The medium term objectives outlined under
ERL, and further developed under subsequent SALs, were to increase competition between
banks, insurance and securities industries, review legal framework for non-bank intermediaries
and eliminate barriers to competition, explore measures to promote institutional investing, define
strategy for public asset and liability management, and reduce foreign barriers to entry in
domestic financial markets.
. The Government has bound itself under the WTO financial services agreement to the
financial services liberalization measures agreed earlier with the OECD.
* The Government liberalized capital markets including: fully opening to foreign investors
the domestic bond market and money market instruments issued by non-financial
institutions; raising the aggregate limit on foreign investment in equities of listed firms
from 26 to 55 percent (subsequently lifted altogether); and eliminating restrictions on
corporate foreign borrowing with longer maturities.
3. Corporate Governance
23. Inclusion of corporate governance as a reform component demonstrated that the Bank
recognized that the crisis was not merely a foreign currency crisis, but had deeper structural
causes in the real economy. In the immediate term, the most important achievement was the
progress made in financial disclosure, which is a prerequisite to meaningful corporate reform.
This progress won back some lost confidence in the external financial sector and showed GOK's
willingness and potential to impose a higher level of transparency required by regulatory
authorities. In the short to medium term, the strategy was to show by the example of best
international practices how Korean, corporations could improve in the area of roles and
8responsibilities of Boards of Directors and in credible performance of external audits. Specific
measures taken in the area of corporate governance include the following.
Strengthened role of directors of companies
* Securities Exchange Act: strengthens minority shareholders' rights by lowering the threshold
for exercising those rights, for example for filing a shareholders' representative suit from 1 to
0.05 percent of outstanding shares, and for inspection rights from 3 to 1 percent. Liberalizes
M&As by eliminating mandatory tender offer requirements, and raising the ceiling for stock
repurchase from 10 percent to 33 percent. Listed companies will be required to have at least
one outside director.
Improved financial disclosure
* External Audit of Joint Stock Corporations Act: accelerates introduction of consolidated
financial statements for corporate groups from the year 2000 to 1999, and requires an audit
selection committee for listed companies and affiliates of large business groups.
- Composition Act: strengthens implementation process by introducing an administrator of
asset preservation, imposing on debtors the obligation to report on implementation, and
requiring evaluation of debtors' implementation by creditors.
Strengthened capital markets
* Bank Act: increases the ceiling on bank ownership of other firms' equity from 10 percent to
15 percent, or higher subject to FSC approval.
24. In general, some key corporate reforms were made quickly. Roles of key players were
clarified, GOK accepted international accounting and audit standards (by 1999 instead of 2000),
and the strengthening of the rights of minority shareholders was accelerated.
4. Competition Policy
25. There have been significant measures promoting competition policy, but action was weak
with respect to the application of the FTA. The GOK could have done much more in supporting
the FTA in terms of policy statements. It would have been especially effective if the KFTC's
audit capability were given real strength. Currently, the KFTC cannot even gain access to
important documents needed for audit. Therefore, it cannot carry out the necessary investigative
role. Pre-merger notification is another important element of competition reform. The KFTC
can evaluate the allowability of a corporate merger only after the merger has taken place, greatly
reducing the likelihood of a challenge. The FTA could also be empowered to eliminate private
restrictions to entry and exit such as the requirement of trade association membership. Another
measure to reduce market concentration is that corporate asset sales be held publicly, not secretly
or through swaps among the chaebols. Allowing unfriendly takeovers would serve also to
increase competition and eliminate inefficiencies in the corporate sector.
9Measures to facilitate entry and exit
* Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act: permits takeovers of non-
strategic companies by foreign investors without government approval, and raises the foreign
stock ownership ceiling without approval by the Board of Directors from 10 percent to 33
percent.
* Bankruptcy Act: concentrates in district courts the authority over involuntary bankruptcy and
composition and reorganization procedures that was formerly divided.
* Reorganization Act: expedites the process by setting deadlines, promoting courts' expertise
by creating an administrative body, and enhancing creditors' role by creating a creditors'
committee.
Measures to promote competition
* Corporation Tax Act: advances removal of the tax exemption regarding interest costs of
excessive borrowings as losses and expenses from year 2002 to 2000.
* Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Act: provides tax breaks for restructuring of firms,
including exemption of SMEs from capital gains tax on sale of real estate used to repay debt
to financial institutions, and on transfers of real estate through M&A.
Measures to promote transparency
* Antitrust and Fair Trade Act: prohibits any new cross debt guarantees and eliminates all
existing cross debt guarantees by the end of March, 2000.
5. Labor Markets/Social Safety Nets
26. The two keys to labor aspects of reform are the ability to make lay-offs and to provide
safety net income to the unemployed. In February 1998, following SAL I negotiations, GOK
and employers' and workers' representatives repealed a suspension on worker dismissals under
the Labor Standards Act of March 1997. Resulting layoffs will facilitate structural change and
ease the pent-up unemployment that was estimated to have climbed to 20 percent in medium
technology sectors and 40 percent in lower technology companies. GOK is also laying the
groundwork for safety net measures by improving the information base for poverty monitoring
and targeting and by committing to a new non-contributory, means-tested social pension for the
elderly (65 and older).
Measures to promote labor market flexibility
* Labor Standards Act: legalizes layoffs under M&As and to avoid financial difficulties.
* Manpower Leasing Act: introduces manpower leasing services for selected jobs requiring
professional knowledge, skills and experience.
* Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act: notification of trade unions will be
handled by local govermments.
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Measures to ease the social costs of adjustment
* Basic Employment Policy Act: authorizes the Ministry of Labor to implement unemployment
measures, including vocational training to promote employment and financial support to
cover living costs and medical care costs for the unemployed.
* Employment Insurance Act: reduces minimum contribution period from 12 to 6 months
temporarily until June 30, 1999; increases minimum duration of benefit period to 60 days and
minimum amount of Job Search Allowance from 50 to 70 percent of minimum wage.
* Wage Bond Guarantee Fund Act: entitles those laid off at bankrupt firms with more than five
workers to a sum equal to three months' pay from a state-managed compensation fund from
July 1.
27. In sumimary, the objectives of ERL were largely accomplished. The performance of the
ERL should also be viewed as part of a broader longer-term series of efforts to stabilize the
Korean economy and return it to a path of sustainable growth. The ERL was the first loan in a
series of planned structural adjustment loans dealing with major aspects of the crisis. ERL
implementation supported preparation of the second loan, the first structural adjustment
operation (SAL I, loan amount - $2 billion, effective March 27, 1998), which placed more
specific, conditionality on the reform framework. The third loan, SAL II ($2 billion), is a two-
tranche operation and became effective in October 23, 1998. Preparation of a fourth loan is
dependent on Korea's needs after implementation of SAL II.
C. Implementation Record and Major Factors Affecting the Project
28. In December 1997, the Bank, along with the IMF and the ADB and bi-lateral donors,
agreed with the Government to support a program of financial and economic stabilization and
structural reforms. Lending was prepared and negotiated by the Bank on a highly accelerated basis
in mid-D)ecember 1997. The ERL was declared effective on December 23, 1997 and the entire $3
billion was disbursed in one transaction on the same day. The ERL closed on February 28, 1998.
29. Leading up to the crisis, the Bank was not conducting economic and sector work on
Korea as it would in the case of an active borrower. Because the crisis also developed suddenly,
there was not time to design the ERL based on a comprehensive data analysis, nor develop
detailed conditionality. Rather, it was derived mainly from still intact staff expertise on Korea
and their priors about the Korean economy, as well as sector and financial distress expertise
gained from countries which had earlier succumbed to the Asian Crisis.
30. B3ecause of the unusual nature of the loan, it was debated whether this type of loan was
justifiable under the Bank's Articles of Agreement. In the preamble to the Loan Agreement (B),
the Bank's authority to make the ERL was described as follows: "under its Articles of
Agreement as interpreted by the Executive Directors of the Bank in 1946, the Bank may, in
special circumstances, make loans for programs of economic reconstruction and reconstruction
of monetary systems, including long-term stabilization loans." In addition, the Bank's legal
department presented as a basis for lending "the lender of last resort" concept (November 29,
1997 memo from I.F.I. Shihata to James Wolfensohn). The Bank was "satisfied that in the
prevailing market conditions the Borrower would be unable otherwise to obtain the loan under
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conditions which in the opinion of the Bank are reasonable for the Borrower." The cases of
Gabon and Venezuela were also cited as countries which had graduated, but had encountered
economic difficulties, including, but not limited to, declines in GNP per capita, and had resumed
borrowing from the Bank
31. Although the ERL was not a standard loan, its approval was not approval of a new
general product line. The ERL had not only a legal basis, but an actual precedent as well. An
ERL had been given to France in 1947. The precedent was that a loan was given to a country
where no economic and sector work or country assistance strategy had been done. Although the
contexts were very different, the precedent eased concern that a new product line was being
approved.
32. Factors not generally subject to Government's control. Korea was disadvantaged in
that its crisis occurred after the crises in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Investor confidence
in the region was already severely shaken. G-7 countries faced domestic resistance to another
bailout, this one to be the largest in the series. There were also signs prior to the actual crisis that
the Korean economy was in a downswing with slowing export growth, declining terms of trade,
and emerging corporate and financial sector distress.
33. The crisis occurred also in the midst of a national election campaign. The election was
held on December 19. One week before, the opposition candidate waged a vigorous attack on
the $57 billion support package. When the new government was elected, however, it fully
embraced the reform framework. The transition period went reasonably well and SAL I was
prepared and approved.
34. It turned out that the victory by the opposition government was an advantage to the
reform program. The opposition won on a platform of change and reform, notwithstanding some
of the rhetoric of the campaign. The new government was receptive, for example, to pro-
competition policies, a culture not well-developed in the Korean economy.
35. Another factor operating in Korea's favor, in terms of regaining financial sector
confidence, was its reputation as a model of economic performance. For several decades, it had
been a low inflation, low unemployment, high growth, budget surplus, low public debt country.
If the crisis could be defused, and a solid reform program adopted, investor confidence could be
restored relatively quickly. Korea also benefited from a strong endowment of human capital as
well as a long track record of hard work and thrift.
36. Factors generally subject to Government control. Leading up to the crisis, the
Government's flawed risk management of international debt and capital flows led to
overexposure in short-term obligations that created the urgent liquidity crisis which was
addressed by the ERL. Over a longer period, the Government also maintained an incentive
regime with a strong element of moral hazard. This incentive regime rewarded conglomerates
when economic times were good, but punished the financial sector, and, by extension, society as
a whole, during less favorable economic conditions.
37. Other measures within the Government's control were laid out in the Letter of
Development Policy for the ERL. The substantial progress made with respect to those factors is
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detailed in Section B. This progress can be attributed, in part, to the urgent need to cooperate
with the IMF/Bank reform package. The prior government also allowed Bank staff to brief
opposition leaders during the election campaign. This policy enhanced acceptance of the reforms
by the new government and provided for a more productive transition period. Both governments
recognized the need for and were committed to reform and understood the economic principles
behind the reform. The reform effort also benefited from Korea's relatively advanced level of
development because there was a good store of expertise on the Korean economy outside the
government that also made substantive contributions to the policy dialogue.
38. Factors generally subject to implementing agency control. The BOK's and MOFE's
responses were good. Both contributed to rapid progress in estimating Korea's immediate
liquidity needs. The overall size of the support package could be determined from these
estinmates. The availability of econonmic and financial data was reasonably good, which
facilitated an early assessment of the extent of the crisis. The teams from both agencies worked
assiduously with Bank and IMF staff during a politically tumultuous period. MOFE played a
key role in coordinating reforms that cut across government agencies.
D. Project Sustainability
39. Without meaningful restructuring, further collapse would only be postponed. The outline
of reforms laid out in the ERL is considered sustainable, first, because this framework identified
areas widely acknowledged to be the sources, not just the symptoms, of Korea's economic crisis,
and, second, because of the numerous key reforms and commitments that were made (Section
B.). The areas of reform were accepted by both the previous and new governments and two
subsequent SALs have been implemented which included specific conditions relevant to the
ERL Fragile investor confidence still threatened the recovery, but, for the short-term, default
was averted. Early incorporation of social safety net measures has helped ease opposition to the
more painful elements of the reform program. The establishment of the committee representing
busirness, government and labor interests was also valuable in gaining support for the ERL
reform framework. A new Korea country unit was established at the Bank in January 1998 to
support both of ERL and subsequent loan program sustainability. To facilitate close interaction
with the client, the new country unit's director was stationed in Seoul. The SFO unit, also
recently established (February 1998), has worked to develop and sustain a program of financial
sector reforms in Korea.
40. Despite some slippages in macroeconomic indicators and structural policy reforms,
overall progress in implementing the objectives of ERL has been satisfactory. Subsequent
planned operations (see section H.) support a continued process of stabilization and structural
reform that emphasize deeper financial and corporate sector reforms and mitigation of the social
side affects of adjustment.
E. Bank Performance
41. This section reviews critiques of Bank performance on the basis of what was a reasonable
standard at the time and what would have been the best course in retrospect. Generally speaking,
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the Bank did respond quickly and substantially once massive default appeared inevitable. With
the GOK and IMF, it engineered a credible reform framework for subsequent lending. The Bank
also navigated through an extremely difficult situation in which a top performing economy with
internationally recognized companies found itself, in a short time span, near collapse. Designing
a program of deep and far reaching reforms and applying them to what was one of the Bank's
greatest success stories was a difficult challenge for Bank staff and management.
The Bank, as well as the Korean authorities, should have more closely tracked events leading
up to the crisis and better guaged its severity. The late recognition of the crisis brought
Korea dangerously close to default and meant that the ERL had to be prepared on an overly
compressed timetable.
There is no documentation to suggest that the Bank (or the IMF) anticipated the Korean
economic crisis or its depth. The mitigating circumstance is that Korea had graduated
from Bank borrowing in FY1 995, there were few Bank funded activities (although there
was a financial sector intermediation loan which was winding down), and almost no Bank
staff working on Korea. The manpower to do economic and sector work and specifically
monitor the Korean financial and corporate sectors was, therefore, not in place. Valuable
time was lost with Korea's delayed request for assistance from the Bank (and IMF).
Because default was imminent, the Bank and the IMF had to work extremely quickly to
design an operation that would allow the emergency transfer of liquidity. Despite the
time pressure, relevant areas of reform were agreed.
* The Bank customized the operation to meet urgent needs
Because of the uniqueness of the ERL and the involvement of very senior Bank
management, the normal loan process could be greatly accelerated to conform to the
exigencies of the crisis. A team with appropriate expertise was quickly recruited. There
was no concept paper, nor regional operating committee review. Furthermore, the loan
amount and terms were not determined until Board presentation when Korea's and the
Bank's needs were more clearly assessed.
* The Bank might have been more involved at the beginning in the GOKIIMF discussions
Initial negotiations on the broad framework for recovery were conducted by the IMF.
The result was that the Bank inherited some features of a reform program that might have
benefitted in design from Bank expertise had the Bank been more involved at the outset.
For instance, the Bank could have contributed to the policy discussion regarding labor
markets/social safety nets. In addition, the GOK would not have been subjected to
repetitious discussion of the macro framework. In reality, the IMF was far more geared
up to intervene in Korea than was the Bank. During the crisis, response time was counted
in days rather than weeks or months. That the IMF negotiated a week before Bank arrival
was to be expected and was valuable to the Bank, because the IMF had already collected
and analyzed data essential to the reform package (e.g., monetary aggregates, growth
projections). The Bank and the IMF soon agreed on areas of collaboration and division
of labor.
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* The Bank, with the Fund, modified an initially ineffective rescue package to one that
ultimately eased the concerns of international financial markets
The IMF's $57 billion package announced on December 4 was inadequate because it
lacked sufficiently rapid phasing to deal with Korea's immediate liquidity demands.2
Frontloading was necessary to avoid default. The Bank committed to frontloading in an
unprecedented way by increasing its initial disbursement from $2 to $3 billion. This
move demonstrated Bank resolve and may have encouraged G-7 countries, referred to as
the second line of defense, also to frontload their support in the package. The
announcement of the frontloading of both multilateral and bilateral support calmed the
markets. G-7 countries also helped by influencing private banks to rollover Korea's debt
($24 billion of short-term debt due in the first quarter of 1998) and lengthen its maturity.
The frontloading and support for debt restructuring apparently provided the missing
elements the financial markets were looking for because the rollover ratio for Korea's
short-term debt improved markedly after the announcement.
It is argued that saving $1-2 two billion for future lending (out of the $3 billion ERL)
would have meant substantially greater support for specific conditions of a longer term
reform program. In the emergency conditions in December 1997, it was concluded,
however, that it was best to minimize default risk and avoid potentially much greater
damage to the economy.
* The Bank could have negotiated more effectively with the GOK to drive through a more
specific reform program which would have made SAL negotiations easier and more
productive.
After the ERL disbursed and the Korean economy began to stabilize, the powerful
chaebols, for example, were able to regroup and muster greater resistance in the reform
dialogs leading up to SAL I and SAL II. The policy dialog was also delegated to lower
level officials in the Government, who moved more slowly. Thus, it is probable that,
despite the extremely tight timetable for loan processing, more policy reform
commitments could have been obtained that would have smoothed the way for
subsequent policy negotiations. Still, in pressing for additional commitments, the
negative effects of possible delays had to be weighed.
* There was insufficient guidance from headquarters to the field team in designing and
negotiating the ERL.
The field team would have benefited from clearer guidance on which issues headquarters
wanted to take a firm stance and where it was more flexible. Earlier determination on
loan pricing would also have helped. However, because the crisis hit suddenly, the Bank
needed time to reassess the impact on the Bank's overall lending before it could give final
lending terms. Actual damage done was probably minimal, but processing would have
flowed more smoothly and morale would have been kept higher.
2 Inefficacy of the package also had to do with the revised debt picture which showed the crisis to be worse than originally
thought.
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The costs of preparing and implementing the ERL were very high
The ERL costs include: (a) an overall effort to staff up a unit to deal with the crisis; (b)
mobilizing a general advisory SWAT team; and (c) preparation of other loans in the
sequence of program lending. Costs are estimated at over $490,000, higher than for
similar operations, assuming that the other activities have been properly separated, but
reasonable when compared to the amount of the loan and the income generated from the
loan. Costs were controlled to some extent by the highly compressed processing
timetable. When recognizing that the Bank's Korea unit had to be geared up, the
somewhat higher costs were acceptable.
42. In summary, although the Bank was not able to anticipate the crisis, it demonstrated,
along with other lenders, a swift response in accelerating balance of payments assistance. On an
extremely compressed timetable, the Bank, with the Government and other donors, identified
several large operations to address major areas of stabilization and structural reform over a two to
three-year period. The Bank consistently held its position that a Government plan for effective
macro-economic stabilization and medium-term structural reform framework were essential
conditions for Board presentation of ERL and closely monitored the measures in the policy
matrix.
F. Borrower Performance
43. As measured by its commitment to a wide ranging reform agenda, Government
performance is considered satisfactory. The Government committed to a set of reforms in its
Letter of Development Policy emphasizing financial sector restructuring and accomplished
almost all of its policy initiatives specified under the objectives of the loan. The ERL laid the
ground for a deeper and more specific set of reforms under subsequent SALs. To carry out these
policy initiatives, GOK committed to a heavy legislative agenda and held special sessions of the
National Assembly. The newly elected government firmly supported the program during the
transition period leading up to its taking office on February 25, 1998. GOK made good early
progress in improving disclosure in the financial sector, the sine qua non of successful reform.
This was a difficult step because of the powerful chaebols linked to the troubled financial
institutions.
44. BOK, on behalf of the Government, maintained the accounts for the ERL in accordance
with sound accounting practices. It was agreed that the program would be audited within four
months of Bank request. Government compliance with legal covenants under ERL was
considered satisfactory.
G. Assessment of Outcome
5. The overall performance and outcome of the ERL was satisfactory, as the identified areas
for medium term policy measures was shown to be relevant as evidenced by subsequent SAL
conditions which deepened the reform program. The ERL was also successful as part of the total
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rescue package, because Korea averted default. This rating is consistent with the rating by
EASPR of meeting development objectives (Form 590) at project close (also Satisfactory).
Because it was not an investment operation, calculation of benefits in terms of net present value
and economic rates of return is not applicable.
H. Future Operations
46. The first Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) was the immediate follow-up operation,
effective March 27, 1998. SAL I ($2 billion) supported Government efforts to deepen structural
reform in the financial sector, corporate sector and social sectors. The next loan (SAL II) was a
two tranche, $2 billion operation building on SAL I. SAL III is planned for FY2000.
I. Key Lessons Learned
47. Because of the special features of the ERL, the lessons learned are far reaching and go to
the core of the Bank's mission. The main lessons learned are:
* Maintaining a knowledge base. The Bank should maintain access to a cadre of high level
expertise that has dealt with occurrences of systemic financial corporate distress, whether
accessed externally or maintained in-house. The Bank's stock of experience on Korea and on
emergencies in the corporate sector had dwindled to a very low level by the time of the
Korean crisis. Assembling a capable team was a very ad hoc exercise. Establishing the SFO,
mostly from existing staff, did establish a capacity to assist a small number of countries
already in financial distress, but not to anticipate financial crises.
* Use of non-government resources. In-country expertise outside of govermnent can be very
useful in diagnosing economic problems, especially where there are large gaps in the Bank's
knowledge or that knowledge is out of date. The Bank team made (and continues to make)
good use of Korean think tanks, universities and NGOs to supplement its knowledge base in
drafting the ERL.
* Maximize negotiation results during crises. Care should be taken to achieve maximum
negotiation results when a country faces an emergency. It is much easier to obtain agreement
on reforms at that time. Because the economic crisis was so severe, the Bank and IMF were
negotiating at the highest levels of the GOK where it is also easier to reach agreement
quickly. Once stabilization measures begin to work, pressure is eased and motivation for
reform lessens. In this crisis, the Bank did use Korea's urgent liquidity needs to secure
commitment to an indicative outline of reforms. Achievement of additional conditionality
and benchmarks should be guided by the trade-off between negotiating results and possible
delays that could jeopardize the effectiveness of the program (in this case, the timely delivery
of liquidity).
* Consultative approach to reforms. Creating a forum of Government, labor and business
leaders for the purpose of achieving consensus on reforms affecting these three major groups
is an effective vehicle to gain support for economic reforms.
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* Disclosure/transparency. An essential initial step in resolving problems in the corporate
sector is disclosure. It is the sine qua non of subsequent reforms, as well as making accurate
credit assessments and regaining the confidence of foreign lenders.
* Need for explicit competition reforms. The ERL contained an explicitly stated, discrete set
of competition reforms as a basis for sustaining the reform program. A clear set of
competition policies was important to Korea because of the rent-seeking, over-investing
behavior of the chaebols that had led to the crisis. The Bank could make greater use of this
practice of incorporating competition measures as part of its program of lending
prescriptions. Reform packages are enhanced when they include competition policies in
areas such as foreign ownership, supervision of banks, and corruption.
* Crisis management tool. The use of parallel teams, one in Korea and one in headquarters
(the latter shepherding papers through by day), was an effective way to accelerate processing
of the Korea ERL.
* Accelerated processing for emergencies. In emergency circumstances such as the Korean
crisis, the Bank demonstrated the necessity of relaxing reporting requirements in order to
respond quickly and so that expertise may be freed for more substantive analysis and creative
solutions.
* Management of portfolio risk. The Bank has to have the capacity to systematically manage
a shift in the risk of its portfolio. To assess risk adjustment for capital allocation in the ERL
case, Bank staff had to improvise to find pricing that would appropriately account for the
sudden change in the Bank's risk profile. At the time the Korean crisis hit, the Bank's
financial policy department had begun to study ways to analyze and estimate risk-adjusted
return on capital in the context of the Bank's capital adequacy requirement.
- Inseparability of program design and loan terms. Lending terrns and substantive reform
program design must be negotiated together. This was not the case for ERL. In fairness, the
borrower should know early on the cost of capital attached to the reform program to which it
is agreeing.
* Single tranche approach. A single tranche policy-based operation (such as ERL), with the
framework for policy actions clearly laid out prior to Board approval, was an effective vehicle
for rapid liquidity transfer. Follow-up SALs restore leverage to the Bank in reform negotiations
after the previous loan is disbursed.
* Need for stronger commitment with regionalized crises. When a crisis is regionalized,
positive results from reforms may be slower to be realized. Investor confidence is more
difficult to restore as well as growth in aggregate demand. The Government and the Bank had
to demonstrate greater resolve in adhering to the reform program.
* Consistency with the Bank's business. The Bank should adhere to a clear concept of what
business it is in and be careful not to redefine its business according to the market
opportunity. That the ERL provided emergency liquidity raised concern that the Bank was
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straying from its role as a development institution. This concern contributed to subsequent
Bank policy in the form of special SALs.
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Table 1: Summary of Assessments
A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable
Macro policies 101 EE 0E0
Sector policies 01 0 0 E
Financial objectives El 0 E 0
Institutional development l E El 0
Physical objectives O E E 0
Poverty reduction El 0 E0
Gender issues O E E 0
Other social objectives O 0 E E
Environmental objectives O E E 0
Public sector management O 0 E E
Private sector development O 0 El O
Other (specify) E E O 0
B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain
M El El
C. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Identification IO 10 E
Preparation assistance 1 10 E
Appraisal O 10 El
Supervision 0 10 E
D. Borrower performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Preparation 0 10 El
Implementation 0 0 E
Covenant compliance O 0 E
E. Assessment of outcome Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Unsatisfactory
l 10 El El
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Table 2: Rtlated Bank Loans
Loan Title Purpose Year of Approval Status
Preceding Operations
1. Financial Internediation Loan Provide TA to the Government and BOK FY94 Closed
to Develop a Program of Structural
Reform in the Financial Sector
Following Operations
1. Structural Adjustnent Loan I Immediate foreign exchange assistanceand FY98 Closed
establishing conditionality for areas of
ERL: financial sector restructuring,
corporate governance, competition, labor
market and safety nets, and institutional
reformn i  economic policy management
and consistency with macroeconomic
framework agreed with the IMF.
2. Structural Adjustment Loan 11 Deepen structural reforms in the financial FY99 Under imnplementation
sector, the corporate sector and labor
market and social safety nets as well as
macroeconomic policies to mnitigate he
recession and consolidate progress in
strengthening the external financial
position, consistent with IMF agreenent.
Table 3: Project Timetable
Steps in Project Circle Date planned Date actual/
latest estimate
Identification N/A
Preparation/Appraisal 12/4-14/97
Negotiations 12/16-1 8/97
Letter of development policy (if applicable) 12/97
Board presentation 12/23/97
Signing 12/23/97
Effectiveness 12/23/97
Full Loan Disbursement 12/23/97
Midterm review (if applicable) N/A
Loan closing 06/30/98
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Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual
(USS thousands)
Appraisal Cumulative Actual As
IBRD Fiscal Year Estimate Actual Actual Percentage of
(US$ thousands) Estimate
1998 N/A 3,000,000 3,000,000 N/A
Date of Last Disbursement: December 23, 1997
Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation
Estimated Actual
L. Key i!mplementation indicators in SAR, Modified, etc.
For all indicators, see Matrix of Policy
Actions-Appendix B)
Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation
Estimated Actual
1. Key operating indicators in SAR, Modified, etc.
For all indicators, see Matrix of Policy Actions-
Appendix B)
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Table 7: Studies Included in Project
Study Purpose as defined at appraisal Status Impact of study
I. NO STUDIES INCLUDED
Table BA: Project Costs
Appraisal estimate Actual
(US$ million) (US$ million)
Item
Local costs Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Costs costs costs
1. Emergency Liquidity Assistance 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Total 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Table SB: Project Financing
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimates
(US$ million) (US$ million)
Source
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
costs costs costs costs
1. IBRD/IDA 3,000 3,000 0 3,000 3,000
Total 3,000 3,000 0 3,000 3,000
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Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits
[LI N/A
Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants
Covenant PresentS Original Revised
Agreement Section Type tatus Fulfillment Fulfillnent Description of Covenant Comments
Date Date
Loan 3.02 (b) I NC 10/30198 10/30/98 Audit of Deposit Account Audit report not yet
requested by the Bank.
Co t type: Present Status
I = Accounts/audits 8 = Indigenous people C = covenant complied with
2 = Financial performance/revenue 9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting CD = complied with after
generation from beneficiaries 10 Project implementation not covered delay
3 = Flow and utilization of project by categories 1- 9 CP = complied with partially
funds 11= Sectoral or cros-sectoral budgetary NC = not complied with
4 = Counterpart funding or other resource allocation
5 = Management aspects of the project 12= Sectoral or cross-sectoral
or executing agency policy/regulatory/institutional action
6 = Environmental covenants 13= Other
7 = Involuntary resettlement
Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements
Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance
FULL COMPLIANCE
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Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs
Planned Revised Actual
Stage of project cycle Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$
Preparation 9.9 31.4 12.1 39.0
Appraisal 14.5 64.8 13.1 59.4
Negotiations 14.5 41.3 7.3 12.7
Supervision 104.1 323.3 115.7 373.5
ICR 2.5 7.0 0.5 1.0
Total 145.5 467.8 148.7 485.6
Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions
Performance
No. of Days in Rating 2 Types of
Stage of project cycle Month/Year Persons Field Specialization I Problems 3
Implementation Development
status objectives
Preparation through 12/97-2/98 25 266 E,F N/A N/A
Supervision
otal 25 266 E,F
I - Specialization 2 - Performance Rating 3 - Types of Problems
= Economist = Minor problems = Financial
= Financial Analyst = Moderate Problems = Technical
Energy Specialist = Major Problems Managerial
P = Political
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Borrower Contribution to the ICR (Implementation Completion Report)
ERL (Economic Reconstruction Loan)
1. Korea Financial Crisis
The imminent cause of the Korean financial crisis that erupted in late 1997 was the near
depletion of foreign currency reserves. Nonetheless, the latent structure of the crisis owes
to other more fundamental factors. Domestic origin of the crisis can be tracked back to
long-standing structural weakness of the Korean economy, although one should
acknowledge the exogenous effects of the epidemics of the Southeast Asian crisis.
Korea's failure to keep up with the rapid pace of globalization was one main reason that
eventually invited the crisis. Korea was ill-prepared for the changes in the global
economic environment. The country's over-exposure to short-term external debt made it
particularly vulnerable to cyclical shocks as well as changes in market expectations. The
Korean economy has long been plagued by pervasive moral hazard problems. Under the
umbrella of government protection, financial institutions indulged in questionable lending
practices. Yet for every reckless lender, there has also been a reckless borrower. One
immediate impact was the sharp loss of investor confidence. In fact, abrupt outflow of
short-term foreign portfolio investment between September and November 1997 initiated
the sudden capital flight and the currency rumble. The won plunged 27.5 percent against
the U.S. dollar in November 1997, and lost 40.3 percent of its value from a year ago in
December 1997. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable for the Korean government
to seek assistance from the international community, including the World Bank.
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2. Introduction of ERL
The $3 billion Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL) was the first loan which the Bank
resumed after Korea's graduation from Bank borrowing in 1995 and greatly contributed
in solving the emergency liquidity problem in Korea. Notwithstanding difficulties arising
fi om situational imperativeness and little experience of both sides, the Korean
government and the Bank closely cooperated in forging out policy measures for Korea's
siructural reforms, which laid the basis for a series of reform programs of leading up to
SAL I and SAL II. While the IMF focused on the macroeconomic stabilization, the Bank
paid more attention to the economic structural reforms in corporate and financial sectors
and etc. The Korean government agreed with the Bank on the importance of the economic
structural reforms and its firm commitment was well reflected in the policy matrix of
ERL.
3. Policy Responses from the Korean Government
The new Kim Dae-Jung administration in Korea showed tremendous resolve and
leadership in overcoming the financial crisis. Even before officially taking office.
President Kim and his advisors worked with the outgoing administration to establish the
Emergency Economic Policy Coordinating Committee. The Committee took a number of
decisive actions that helped to restore the confidence of the international community in
Korea's economic policies. Under President Kim's strong leadership, the Korean
govermnent faithfully implemented the World Bank and the IMF program, oftentimes
going beyond the measures required by those institutions. As a result, not only has
Korea's international credibility been restored, successful reform measures, in fact, have
helped put the Korean economy back on track for positive growth.
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4. A Few Lessons from the ERL
A few lessons should be noted from Korea's experience with the ERL with an aim to
increase the efficiency of such programs in the future.
First, it is most important that the world Bank programs are designed within an
atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill so that they reflect the respective country's
unique situation - its fiscal status, industrial structure and social system. The more a
country in distress worries about the measures the Bank program may impose, the more
hesitant it will become to seek Bank assistance. In any case, a closer tailoring of
individual programs will minimize unexpected economic side effects resulting from the
Bank Programs. Second, when a country enters into negotiations on conditionalities with
the assisting institutions, the World Bank, the IMF, and the regional IFI's should work
together to better coordinate the conditionalities to be imposed on the country. Numerous
renegotiations with various institutions result in inefficiency and excessive burden, and
thus can weaken the program ownership in the borrower country. Finally, the Bank's
staffs need to be more responsive to the policy demands of the borrower. It is more
effective for the Bank to endorse the reform programs implemented by the country and
facilitate their promotion in a desirable manner rather than focus on excessively
ambitious targets in a specific sector.
5. Further Progress of Reform Efforts
The Korean government's economic policies will focus on full implementation of
ongoing reforms which trace back to the agreed policy measures of ERL. At the same
time, policy prudence will be exercised to counteract potential instability from overseas
as well as domestic markets. The Korean govermment's economic policies are firmly
rooted in the principle the democracy and market economy are interlocked concepts. In
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this sense, the government is firmly committed to full economic integration with the
global economy for the country's long-term stability and prosperity. To this end, the
Korean government will continue to accelerate its structural reform efforts in the future.
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MATRIXOFPOLICYACTIONS (MARCH 1998)
Objective Policy Measurei 1torxig I-dicators
1. Macroeconomic Framework
Restoration of financial Sound management of macroeconomic policies--fiscal, monetary, Adherence to the agreed macroeconomic framework
stability and resumption of debt management, exchange rate policies--within an agreed medium-
robust, sustained growth tenn framework
2. Financial Sector
2.1 Strengthening the Regulatory
and Institutional Framework.
Implement financial sector * Endow the Special Task Force at MOFE (and its successor later at Task Force fully operational and actively carrying
restructuring within a coherent, FSC) with adequate powers to coordinate the development and out its mandate.
well-coordinated sector implementation of financial sector recapitalization and restructuring
strategic framework. strategy, under mandate set in consultation with the Bank.
Develop an overall strategy for financial sector recapitalization and Strategy developed in consultation with the Bank.
restructuring, with assistance of World Bank and other international Issuance of written policies and guidelines on
expertise. financial restructuring consistent with that strategy.
Strengthen the legal and * Adopt legislation acceptable to Bank to give supervisory Law adopted.
institutional framework for the authorities increased power to intervene and resolve troubled
resolution of troubled financial institutions.
institutions. Adopt a resolution mechanism for insolvent financial institutions, Insolvent institutions dealt with consistently and in
including receivership rocedures and policy on subsequent accordance with well-defned procedures.
divestiture.
Improve the framework for Establish a framework to facilitate workouts between creditors and Establishment of the workout framework and its
troubled debt resolution. corporations. transparent application to individual cases.
Issue clear guidelines on the prudential and tax treatment of Regulations issued and published.
restructured debt.
Improve the regulatory * Announce timetable acceptable to Bank for upgrading bank Public issuance of regulatory accounting principles
framework. accounting, auditing and reporting to international standards (see (RAP) and standards consistent with international
also Corporate Governance below). best practice. Establishment of legal auditing
responsibilities.
* Announce a policy of requiring financial institutions to close Policy announced.
books and report publicly on a quarterly basis at the earliest date
possible.
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Objective Policy Measure Mozutoring Tudicators
improve and harmonize prudential and market practice regulations Regulations for deposit-taking institutions (including
applicable to deposit-taking institutions. merchant banks) harmonized.
Tighten regulations relating to connected lending and accounting of Rules on connected lending and trusts tightened.
trusts
Strengthen supervision. As part of the process of establishment of FSC/FSB, and an Institution-building strategy agreed with Bank.
institution- building strategy agreed with Bank, undertake in-depth Report issued. TA in place for FSC/FSB. Policies and
review of foreign major-market supervisory and regulatory regimes procedures issued.
integrating banking, securities and insurance supervision and adopt
appropriate policies and procedures for risk-oriented supervision.
Improve governance of banks Review and improve governance structure of banks (including Necessary changes in laws, regulations and
and other financial institutions. provisions relating to appointment, responsibilities and liabilities of guidelines.
directors and managers).
* Confirm notification to banking industry of the Government Adherence to such policy.
policy of non-intervention in bank management, including the
appointment or approval of directors and managers.
Further develop deposit Implement the consolidation of the various deposit insurance Adoption of appropriate guidelines, policies.
insurance. schemes.
Increase foreign participation Accelerate removal of ceilings on foreign investment in banks, other Liberalization of foreign investment/ownership limnits
in banks and capital market, financial institutions and listed companies. as agreed.
incl. M&As.
2.2 Resolution of Merchant Banks
Clarify processes for * Put in place the following to the satisfaction of the Bank: Appropriate notification to merchant banks.
evaluation and closure of - Written instructions for due diligence review. Demonstrated integrity of rehabilitation plans.
merchant banks, ensuring only - Arrangement of internationally recognized firms to conduct
viable banks allowed to rehabilitation plan evaluations.
operate. - Adoption of standardized templates for review of
rehabilitation plans and recommendations.
- Application of clear standards and instructions to merchant
bank evaluations, providing the basis for well-documented
decisions on closure or continuation of operation.
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- Establishment of a proc&fiss to monitor conditionalities
placed on merchant banks allowed to continue to operate,
including capital adequacy thresholds.
Require the merchant bank * Implement the following actions to the satisfaction of the Bank: Legal review, policies, procedures prepared.
closure and asset transfer - Evaluate the legal basis for closure and asset transfer, and
process to be conducted in a take steps procedurally and legislatively to address potential
transparent and judicious legal vulnerabilities. Legally establish the order of creditor
manner. repayment.
- Clarify Bridge Bank's role as liquidator, asset manager, and
deposit insurance paying agent.
- Prepare procedures for revoking the license, closing the bank,
physical control, inventory/due diligence, and asset
valuation. If external bids allowed, establish when external
bids will be accepted after license revocation,
- Establish how funds realized from asset sales will be
distributed.
Close all unviable merchant banks. Closure of unviable merchant banks by April 30.
All surviving merchant banks to meet capital adequacy guidelines
already agreed.
Strengthen supervision policies and practices for those allowed to
remain open.
2.3 Resolution of Korea First Bank
and Seoul Bank.
Complete the resolution of Hire internationally recognized advisors on TOR acceptable to the Contract with advisors by March 31.
these two banks. Bank to develop strategy for privatizing these two banks.
Send out notification to internationally recognized investment banks Contract with investment banks by March 31.
for assistance in the privatization and sale of these banks on TOR
acceptable to Bank.
Assess asset quality of these banks and perform diagnostic audits. Issuance of notification inviting tenders for due
Commit to particular strategy to privatize and sell (by Nov. 15). diligence and external audits by internationally
Undertake cost reduction plans, staff layoffs and management recognized firms.
reconfiguration prior to sale. Further layoffs and reconfiguration
allowed after sale. Commit not to inject new public funds in these
banks after Jan. 31, except to maintain minimum liquidity to service
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Objective Policy Measure Monitoring ndicators
liabilities. Bring in foreign investors who will provide expertise and
capital inflow.
2.4 Commercial Banks
Improve the quality of data on Hire internationally recognized firns on TORs acceptable to Bank Contracts with firms by March 31.
conmmercial bank portfolios for external audits, including diagnostic reviews, of all commercial
and assessment of capital banks.
adequacy.
Intensive supervision of capital adequacy of all commercial banks Evidence of application of new, stronger standards.
(including validation of fixed asset valuation, and enforcement of
improved provisioning and loan classification standards).
Assess viability of banks. * Require that all banks not meeting BIS capital adequacy standards Rehabilitation plans prepared.
on 12/31/97 provide recapitalization and rehabilitation plans of
sufficient scope and detail acceptable to Bank. Same condition to
apply to those not meeting these standards on 6/30/98 and
subsequent reporting dates.
Verify viability and take * Hire internationally recognized frms on TORs acceptable to Bank Contracts with fimns.
enforcement actions. to assess recapitalization and rehabilitation plans.
Implement graduated enforcement policies (per new law). Closure of unviable banks.
Close unviable banks.
2.5 Transparency of Government
Support.
Appropriately record all public * Account for all past support to troubled financial institutions and Actual recording/reporting of public support in this
support to troubled financial corporates in a transparent manner, recording not only interest costs manner in fiscal accounts and public debt figures.
institutions and corporates. in the budget but also reflecting the stock of debt incurred by
government and related agencies in the overall public debt figures.
Provide a report on these estimates to the Bank.
Continue this accounting practice.
Clarify procedures for public * Announce policy that, with effect from the date of the policy Policy announced.
support. announcement, KAMC and other agencies involved in government
support will provide such support only as part of approved
recapitalization/rehabilitation plans or liquidation.
It shall be government policy that KAMC will purchase assets at Policy announced.
estimated market value, and that assets will be sold back to the
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private sector as rapidly as possible.
Enforce sound principles for * Issue written procedures for KAMC and Bridge Bank operating Procedures and guidelines issued.
KAMC and Bridge Bank process, internal control, transfer pricing, asset valuation, asset sales
operations. and bid process (where applicable) and governance.
Regular disclosure of financial position, including an independent Implementation of these procedures and guidelines:
valuation of assets. External audits by internationally recognized financial reports, audits.
firms. Capital and borrowing structure clarified and funding
instruments tandardized. Institutional capacity improved, including Improvements in governance structure and technical
through inclusion of private sector in governance structure. capacity, including through use of TA.
2.6 Capital Markets
Promote competition between Review and harmonize regulatory regime for alternative providers of Progress on harmonization of regulatory regime to
different fnancial service savings vehicles and their lending and investment policies to reduce reduce market segmentation.
providers to improve the financial market segmentation and barriers to competition.
efficiency of intermediation
and spur the diversification and
deepening of the financial
system.
Implement debt market reform * Establish a task force (including private sector experts as well as Establishment of a task force.
conducive to more market- public authorities) to study policies to promote primary and Primary and secondary market activity indicators.
based determination of the secondary debt market.
interest rate/term structure and Regularize announcement of government securities.
market deepening, including a Standardize maturities and instruments while developing the longer
lengthening of maturities. end of the yield curve.
Reduce auction of government bonds through obligatory purchases.
Consider issuing KDIC bonds in the market including auction
(instead of issuing to BOK).
Explore possibilities of increasing issuance of T-bills to replace
MSB currently issued by BOK.
Improve bond market information, trading and clearing systems, and
promote an active inter-dealer broker market.
Develop the equity market to * Establish a task force to review appropriateness of current market Task force established.
reduce the gearing ratio of configuration. Implementation of the indicated actions.
fmns and broaden access to Increase transparency of equity market regulations and reduce
equity fnance. discretionary power of regulators.
Liberalize IPO regulations while tightening requirements for
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disclosure.
Promote competition among broker-dealers by enforcing regulations
against fixihg. Rationalize prudential regulations and minimum
capital requirements for brokers according to the risk they take.
Promote KOSDAQ and enhance small business access to equity
finance
Enhance investor confidence in Ensure independence (and accountability) of securities regulatory Steps toward these improvements in the securities
the securities market. authority and strengthen the role of KSE and other securities market regulatory regimne.
industry SROs (including strengthening prudential rules and their
enforcement).
Promote the development of Encourage the creation and supervision of investment vehicles with Develop an enabling legal framework satisfactory to
institutional public participation such as mutual funds and private pension funds, the Bank.
investors/contractual savings and remove restrictions on the exercise of their voting rights (subject Establishment of sound regulatory and supervisory
institutions. to prudential rules on the proper use of these rights) to improve regime for institutional investors/contractual savings
corporate governance. institutions.
Removal of limits on rights issues by fnancial
institutions.
3. Corporate Sector
3.1 Corporate Governance
Improve the quality and Rationalize the institutional framework for setting standards, Amend Law on External Audit and all other
reliability of key financial regulating, and overseeing the accounting and auditing profession so applicable laws and rules to effect this change.
information provided by banks that an independent and self-regulating KICPA is responsible for:
and corporations to regulators, sponsoring and setting up an independent accounting standard
shareholders, and the general setting organization comprising members of accounting profession,
public. business, government and academia; and for setting auditing
standards, regulating and overseeing the profession, and ensuring
implementation of the standards consistent with international best
practice.
* Announce that financial statements of listed companies, banks and Revise accounting and auditing standards to make
other fnancial institutions, as well as all joint stock companies with them consistent with international best practice, and
assets in excess of 7 billion Won, will be required to be prepared and revise relevant laws and rules as necessary to require
audited in accordance with standards consistent with international that financial statements be prepared and audited in
best practices and standards beginning with the year 1999. accordance with such standards beginning with the
year 1999. This will include significant
improvements in asset classification, loss and income
recognition, presentation of financial statements, and
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financial statement disclosure.
Issue implementing rules for consolidated financial
statements for majority owned companies and
combined financial statements for all major
commonly controlled enterprises, such rules to be
effective not later than 1999 and applied without
exemption.
Strengthen the internal control structure of listed companies, banks, A study to be conducted on the introduction of audit
financial institutions and all joint stock companies and the related committees of the boards of directors in Korea in
responsibility for the oversight of the internal audit function and accordance with international best practice. This
selection of external auditors. study will be completed by Sept. 30, 1998, under
TOR acceptable to Bank.
Promote effective monitoring Boards of directors of listed companies, banks and other financial Submit legislation to the National Assembly to
of corporate performance by institutions, and large corporations to be effective decision-making strengthen duties of directors to act in the best
boards of directors and bodies responsible for acting in the best interests of the company. interests of the company.
shareholders. Require that listed companies, banks and major
government enterprises subject to the Act on the
Management Reform and Privatization of Public
Enterprises include at least one outside director on
their boards of directors.
Preparation of a study of the role and function of
boards of directors as users of corporate financial
information and monitors of company management.
Directors to be responsible to companies and shareholders for their Submit legislation to National Assembly to
actions. strengthen minority shareholder rights by lowering
substantially the threshold for exercising these rights:
e.g., the right to file shareholder epresentative suits;
the right to make proposals at a general meeting; and
the right of inspection of company records.
Preparation of a study of the implications of
introducing class action law suits by shareholders of
listed companies.
Introduce market-based * Submit to National Assembly insolvency laws (bankruptcy, Appropriate amendment of laws.
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Objective Policy Measure Monitoring Indicators
bankruptcy procedures and composition, and corporate reorganization) to resolve jurisdictional
facilitate efficient liquidation conflicts, build administrative capacity, expedite procedures,
of insolvent corporations. enhance creditor participation in the reorganization process and
establish economic criteria for initiation of the reorganization
process.
Review laws on bankruptcy, composition and reorganization, with a Preparation of study by end-1998 under TOR agreed
view to harmonization and enhancing efficiency. with Bank and thereafter enactment of appropriate
legislation.
3.2 Competition Policies
Foster competition and * Government will issue a policy statement announcing the a. KFTC will publish information on chaebol M
efficiency in the financial and following measures regarding the restructuring of chaebols, &A, divestitures and restructuring within 30 days of
industrial sectors. ensuring the full force and application of the FTA, to increase the transaction being permitted/disallowed.
accountability and transparency and provide equal economic b. will provide Bank with a detailed report and
opportunity: analysis of all such cases notified and considered, in
* shall not permit business combinations which substantially a format to be agreed with the Bank prior to July 31,
reduce competition in a given market. 1998.
* shall foster the entry and/or takeover of divested chaebol
operations by new domestic or foreign firms.
* shall publish information on the reasons and factors considered
in permitting/disallowing business combinations among the
chaebols.
. further reduce the use of mutual guarantees by
affiliates/subsidiaries.
* Government will appoint a joint private/public Committee, with Draft and adopt appropriate legislation in accordance
TOR acceptable to Bank, to recommend amendments to the FTA with best practice acceptable to Bank prior to July 31,
and identify measures which: 1998.
* strengthen the market efficiency objectives
* make its provisions fully and uniformly applicable to all
economic sectors, including the parastatals and public entities
* increase investigative powers.
* increase sanction powers of KFTC.
* provide appropriate consumer protection.
* Government will issue a policy statement indicating it will take a. KFTC to provide information satisfactory to the
active steps to reduce public and private barriers to entry and exit Bank regarding application of the FTA; its
and, in monopolized infrastructure services and utilities, design a application to national and foreign firms.
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regulatory framework to promote competition, through such b. Prepare an official position paper on regulatory
measures as fostering new domestic and/or foreign private sector reform and privatization of infrastructure services in
market entrants. accordance with international best practice prior to
July 31, 1998
Strengthen the operational Government will enable KFTC to strengthen its Policy Analysis and a. Appropriate decree issued.
capacity of KFTC Evaluation capacity, on TOR acceptable to Bank, for the purposes b. KFTC to prepare work plan acceptable to Bank
of conducting in-depth studies of market structure and other prior to April 30, 1998.
elements affecting competition, including adequate authority to c. KFTC to develop and publish indicators affecting
collect data and publish findings. competition such as entry and exit of firms, changes
in regulations, import penetration, foreign direct
investment, M & A activity, etc.
Develop comprehensive merger guidelines applicable to all sectors KFTC to prepare such guidelines, acceptable to the
of the economy and other areas such as inter-firm collaborative Bank, prior to July 31, 1998.
agreements.
Adopt measures to promote transparency in KFTC operations, KFTC will report the number of interventions,
guidelines for case selection, publishing of case information, and dissemination of public position papers related to
advocacy. regulatory reform and fostering competition.
* Develop strategies for institutional development of KFTC to KFTC will provide Bank with detailed progress
enhance its ability to implement competition law and policy in report, prior to July 31, 1998.
accordance with best practice, including a detailed technical
assistance program acceptable to Bank.
4. Labor Market and Social
Safety Net
4.1 Labor Market
Improve labor market * Repeal the 2-year suspension in effectiveness of Article 31 and Government will submit bill to National Assembly in
flexibility and facilitate clarify definition of dismissal for managerial reasons. Feb. 1998.
redeployment of labor.
*Allow operation of private manpower leasing services. Government will submit bill to National Assembly in
Feb. 1998.
* Commitment to relax legal restrictions on the private provision of New Presidential Decree revising the Employmentjob placement services. Security Act in March 1998.
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Improve the functioning of the Increase number and quality of public employment offices to By June 30, 1998, complete review of the
labor market. complement private employment services. effectiveness of public employment services.
Develop a cooperative operational framework for
public and private providers.
Improve labor market information systems to monitor effects of Conduct an annual earnings survey covering
adjustment and facilitate evaluation of reforms. establishments with fewer than 5 workers starting
Nov. 1998.
Improve targeting, contain costs, and eliminate programs of the Prepare strategic policy report by December 1999
Employment Insurance System found to be inefficient with a view to improving the Unemployment Benefit
Scheme and to creating a more efficient Employment
Security System and Job Ability Development
System.
Increase worker protection. Expand coverage of the Employment Insurance System to firms Extended coverage implemented by July 1998.
with 5 or more workers.
* Commitment o expand coverage of the Unemployment Benefits Complete by end-1998 a feasibility report assessing
Scheme to firms with fewer than 5 workers as early as possible. options to expand coverage by January 2000.
Ensure financial sustainability of the Unemployment Benefit Adjust the payroll contribution rate consistent with
Scheme changes in the benefit structure and the
unemployment rate.
Secure funding for retirement allowance and wage arrears in Necessary change in law enacted in February 1998.
financially troubled firms. Give claimants priority creditor status and
establish a public compensation fund which pre-finances these
claims. The fund is to be financed from employers contributions and
other sources.
Apply labor standards to all workers. Expand coverage of relevant sections (including
those for women and workers below the age of 18) of
the Labor Standards Act to those in establishments
with fewer than 5 workers in January 1999.
Reduce gender inequalities in Review regulations that impose high costs on women's employment. Examine labor regulations and programs affecting
the labor market. women including the possibility of moving the
responsibility of paying maternity and related
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benefits from the employer to a fund financed by
social insurance contributions; discuss review
findings with stakeholders by December 1999.
4.2 Protecting the Poor
Improve poverty monitoring. Establish a consistent official poverty line to be used in means- Publish report by March 1999.
testing antipoverty programs.
Develop a multipurpose national household survey system linking Develop a multipurpose household survey data set in
household income and expenditures to utilization of social services. 1998.
Prepare a complete national poverty profile analyzing the Publish poverty profile report in 1999.
magnitude, causes and consequences of poverty.
Improve targeting of public * Commitment to maintain constant in real terms the level of public Allocate adequate budget in 1998.
antipoverty programs. expenditure per beneficiary on major antipoverty programs,
including the livelihood program and the medical aid program.
* Commitment to expand in real terms the total budget allocations Allocate adequate budget in 1998.
to antipoverty programs proportionately with any increase in the
prevalence of poverty due to the crisis.
Undertake a thorough review of the effectiveness and efficiency of Hold national workshop on findings in 1999.
antipoverty programs based on the multipurpose national household
survey.
Rationalize targeting of antipoverty programs so as to mitigate the Announce program of improvements following
impact of the crisis on the poor. national poverty workshop by end-1999.
4.3 Pension System
Securing income support for * Implement he planned non-contributory and means tested "social Allocate adequate budgetary resources in 1998 to
the elderly. pension" fmanced from general budget for individuals aged 65 and implement he plan.
above.
Implement he planned extension of coverage of the national pension Issuance of appropriate decree no later than October
system to urban self-employed and to workers in establishments with 1, 1998.
fewer than 5 employees.
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* Communicate clearly that the sustainability of the current system Press communication on the need to improve
needs to be improved and that in an upcoming reform adjustments in sustainability of the current system prior to extension
the contribution and benefit structure must take place. of coverage.
Improving transparency and * Agreement o gradually phase out government borrowing from In consultation with the Bank, announce by June 30,
efficiency of pension fund pension fund reserves in the form of direct credits and to gradually 1998, an implementation timetable, which includes
management. phase in government borrowing from pension fund reserves in the appropriate revision of the Public Fund Management
form of sale of marketable government bonds. Act.
Strengthen the tri-partite asset management committee for the Necessary change in law enacted before July 1,1998.
national pension reserve fund, responsible for strategic decisions of
asset allocation and determination of benchmarks for risk and return.
Strengthen the professional investment unit in the National Pensions Training of staff of investment unit in international
Corporation in charge of the daily investment decisions according to fmancial institutions.
the portfolio envelope and benchmarks from the committee.
Outsource a rising part of the investment decisions to private asset Publication of a quarterly performance report by
management firms selected in a transparent and competitive manner. 1999.
The investment unit is in charge of performance monitoring and
supervision, and reports investment perfornance on monthly basis.
Securing an efficient, equitable Initiate no pension reform without costing and broad-based political
and fnancially sustainable discussion.
pension system in the long run.
Establish a Government Task Force to draft a White Paper on Establishment of the Task Force by October 1998.
Pension Reform, with TOR to investigate the financial sustainability,
equity and efficiency of the current system together with reform Draft of the White Paper to be discussed in a tin-
options, including: partite forum by 2000.
1. the integration of the national pension system with the other three
occupational pension schemes,
2. splitting the current national system into a basic and earnings-
related component, and
3. the integration of the retirement allowance in a funded and
privately managed defined-contribution plan.
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5. Economic Management and
Institutions
Improve the institutional Implement he proposed reorganization of economic policy Necessary legislation passed and directives issued,
framework for economic functions between MOFE and the Offices of the President and the specifying agency responsibilities and coordination
policy making. Prime Minister to support improved and better coordinated mechanisms.
economic management.
Improve debt and asset liability Within a time-bound schedule: set up an external debt management An external debt management office established.
management. office with responsibility, and capacity, for upgrading debt Improved coordinating mechanism on external
monitoring (including monitoring private external debt); establish a borrowing strategy and ALM instituted.
systematic coordination mechanism among the agencies involved, TA availed.
with clearly defined mandates, in determining external borrowing
strategy and improving external asset-liability management (ALM)
and linkages to macroeconomic and prudential management; and
avail TA on TOR acceptable to Bank to support this upgrading of
debt and asset-liability management
Streamline public Implement he proposed consolidation and refocusing of govermment Necessary legislation passed, directives issued, and
administration. ministries to improve efficiency, clarify and decentralize reform work program specified
responsibility, and strengthen accountability.
Note: Entries with an asterisk denote "prior actions," taken before SAL I Board presentation.
